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Is the state in modern circumstances a necessary and inevitable form of social
organization, one, which once it emerges in a given society, is a permanent fix-
ture? This is the question that will be critically considered in this book. What is
meant bythe stateínthíscontext is a political entitycomprising a variety of in-
stitutions, which exercise control over violence within particular territorial
boundaries.
We will consider the specific case of Somalia, which has been withouta state
since r99r. The Somali state collapsed when, at the climax of the civil war at the
beginning of r99r, president Siyad Barre, his family and select political entou-
rage were left with no other option than to flee their residence'Villa Somalia'
in the capital Mogadishu. The numerous clan-affiliated factions which had
collaborated to take control of most of the country and which finally won the
battle for Mogadishu were not able to unite in forming a new government. As
a result, the territory of the former Somali state was controlled by different
military factions and fell apart, politically, into various territorial units. In
1998, as I finish writing this book, there are a number of different political enti-
ties on Somali territory, including the self-proclaimed Republic of Somaliland
in the Northwest and the autonomous regional state of Puntland in the
Northeast. There are also numerous locally governed political entities in the
South, where different faction leaders exercise politico-military dominance
over particular territories, whose boundaries remain unsettled. Sporadic
fighting and political maneuvering continue up to the present time.
Although the institutions, which constituted the Somali sfafe collapsed, the
Somali people continued their life, albeit with patterns of existence other than
state-driven socio-economic and political arrangements. Some parts of
Somali society seem to have been able to manage quite well without the state.
Others, which had suffered under state authority, have seen little improve-
ment in the no-state situation. These phenomena challenge the assumed
necessity of modern state institutions to social life.
The focus of the following study is the Somali experience as a society con-
fronting the collapse of the modern state. Throughout the recent stateless
years in Somalia political authority formation has taken different forms,
26 Society, Security, Sovereignty and the State in Somalia
which raises questions about the direction to be taken by future Somali state
formation processes. Our empirical analysis of Somali state collapse and
state(s) formation is intended as a contribution to the discussion of the mod-
ern state, its nature, purpose and future.
State-Centered Theories of Sovereignty and Security and its Critics
In recent years, the universal validity of the concept of the modern state, in the
context of the political, social and economic realities of modern societies has
been increasingly called into question. Critics call attention to two develop-
ments: a tendency towards global governance and trans-national loyalties and
identities on the one hand; and, on the other hand, the increasing political im-
portance oflocalized structures, reflected in sub-national oyalties and identi-
ties. The first trajectory refers mainly to the developed, Western world where
the tendency of political and economic decision-making by trans-national
bodies, such as witnessed in the context of the European Union Amsterdam
Treaty, is widening (Held, 1995, Linklater, rggs). The second trajectory is de-
veloped in the context of weak or collapsing states in the Southern part of the
world, particularly in Africa (Grindle, 1996; Olukashi and Laakso, 1996,
Zartman, rggl). In the light of these developments, the question is often asked
whether the state is still necessary or whether the political institution of the
modern state is damned to increasing insignificance. As Linklater Q995: p.r78,
p.r93) notes:
A myriad of factors are currently transforming political communities
across the world and, as the century comes to an end, the time is indeed ripe
for enunciating new principles of political life which break with the tyranny
ofthe concept ofthe state. ... The consequent failure to theorize the world
outside the state has left the modern political imagination profoundly im-
poverished.
What, then, should be the starting point of our inquiry? The alternative to a
state-centered analysis is to take society as a reference point. In this book, soci-
ety is defined in a broad way as a conglomeration of people who tend to inter-
act more with each other on social, cultural, economic and political dimen-
sions than they do with those who are not members of the same society.
Obviously, such a concept is indeterminate, both in the sense that one can
speak both ofEuropean society and ofFrench society, for example, and in the
sense that the more marginal a member is, the greater his or her interaction









































have fixed or determinate geographic boundaries and if it does, these do not
necessarily coincide with those of any particular state. Society is highly differ-
entiated and a less coherent unit of analysis than the state. Unlike the state, it
does not speak as an anthropomorphic entity (Waever, Buzan, Kelstrup,
Lemaitre, 1993).
A society is characterized by social integration as well as social fragmenta-
tion. Social integration might derive internally from commonly perceived or
transmitted ethnic roots, common descent or language. It might go alongwith
political integration in cases where integrated state-society relations prevail.
Externally-driven social integration might be stimulated by a commonly per-
ceived enemy. Social fragmentation exists in various forms and multiple lay-
ers, such as gender, religion, clan, class and age. Segmentarylineage societies,
such as Somali society (Lewis, 196r), can be extremely fragmented into tribes
or clans. Nevertheless, close bonds of family and kinship are counterbalanced
by strong individualism. The nomadic sector of Somali society, particularly,
has an individualistic, egalitarian component. In addition, Somali society has
undergone a transformation process whereby lineage fragmentation and the
political perceptions of the individual as citizen have become molded into a
sometimes contradictory and conflict-prone whole.
Society is continually shaped and re-shaped and is, finally, the product of
decisions people make concerning when, how and with whom they interact
(Howard, 1993). Social identity patterns, such as ethnic belonging, gender and
historical precedent all influence this decision. I will assume that the prevail-
ing and inherently dominant factor in determining people's choices and sub-
sequently identities is the search for relative security.
In the study that follows, the search for security is thus considered the key
factor determining political authority formation. Conventional theory in se-
curity studies is centered on the state, the dominant political authority in the
contemporary world system:
Realism's construction of the possibilities for political order, of the realm of
politics, and thus ofsecurityyields both an object to secure (the territorially
defined political community) and an agent to pursue this end (the state)
(Williams and Krause, 1997: p.xiv).
Within such a framework, the institutions that make up a modern state are
supposed to play the role ofcaretaker for a basically integrated society. The ba-
sic relation between state and society, the raison d'être of a state, is containment
ofviolence. The principal concern ofconventional security studies is the prob-
lem ofhow to contain or control violence, conflict or war between states. State



































from within society. Furthermore, violent conflict often evolves from state poli-
cies that threaten the security ofits population. An approach to security studies
that limits itself to the category of state, to peace and security between states,
cannot grasp the multitude of phenomena of conflict and insecurity.
In contrast to the conventional approach to security studies a debate has
developed that takes a critical perspective vis-à-vis the state-centric line of
thought. According to the critical security approach, both the object ("theter-
ritorially defined political community", see the quotation above) and the
agent ("ïhe state") need to be scrutinized when defining the possibilities for
political order, the realms of politics and of security.
Moving towards a society-centered analysis of political order involves
re-thinking not only the role ofthe state, but also the related concept ofsover-
eignty. When taking up Linklater's challenge to "theorize the world outside the
state" (see p.z6), we must therefore also theorize sovereignty independently
from the state. We can do this by reconsidering the theoretical link between se-
curity and sovereignty as expressed in normative theories of state formation by
consent, which trace the genesis of sovereign authority to consent given by
members of society. According to the consent theory, sovereign authority is
granted for and therefore conditional upon the provision ofsecurity to those
who vest political authority in the'sovereign'. The link between securify and
sovereignty, therefore, ultimately derives from the people who participate in
building a society - the social unit in which the origin of sovereignty lies.
In the theoretical framework that I develop for the analysis of the Somali
case I link the debate on security with that on sovereignty and state-formation.
I assume that the political concept of sovereignty is not satisfactorily described
as indivisible state sovereignty, but must be seen as divided between various
security agents within and outside society. State formation can only be sus-
tainable if the state as one institution among others proves to be the superior
security-providing agency for society.
With these considerations in mind, an analysis of the Somali case - of a peo-
ple that moved from statelessness, through state formation and collapse, back
to statelessness and further to new kinds of political authority formation - can
contribute to contemporary discussions about political community, state for-
mation and the future of the state as the most prominent institution for politi-
cal order. In the analysis that follows, I intend to draw on society-centered
security studies, which consider the modern state framework as just one option
for society in the search for relative security and for the investment of political
authority and sovereignty. At the end of the analysis I will return to the ques-
tion whether, in the light of the Somali experience, a shift in the security debate









































The Collapse of the Somali State
A functional as well as an institutional definition of the state guides the analy-
sis of the Somali experience that follows. The primary function of the state is
considered to be security provision, and throughout the case study we will be
asking how the Somali state performed in that function. In exercising this par-
ticular role, the ideal state both serves and is controlled by society.
Drawing on the Weberian definition of the state, Buzan (r99r) suggests a
triad ofcomponent parts ofany state: (r) the idea ofthe state; (z) the physical
base ofthe state, i.e. its territory and population; and (3) the institutional ex-
pression ofthe state. The first pillar ofthe state - the idea ofa state - is reflected
in its underlying political identity. "The notion of purpose is what distin-
guishes the idea of the state from its physical base and its institutions" (ibid.:
p.6g-Zo). Buzan refers, in this respect, both to different variants of nation-
states, and to their organizing ideologies, such as political, economic, religious
or social ideologies. With regard to the second component - the physical base
of the state, including territorial borders, and the population, natural re-
sources and man-made wealth within these borders - the size of its population
is seen as more influential than the size of its territory in determining the per-
manence of a state. State territory is the most specific of the three state compo-
nents, and the international system relies on territorial demarcations ofstates.
State territory can be threatened by other states and/or by claims for inde-
pendence or separatist movements within the state. The third component,
the institutional expression of the state, comprises "the entire machinery of
government, including its executive, legislative, administrative and judicial
bodies, and the laws, procedures and norms by which they operate" (ibid.:
p.8z).
The Buzan triangle of state components enables us to develop a classifica-
tion of states in terms of different threats and weaknesses. The ideology of the
state, its territorial integrity, or its major institutions, can all be threatened.
The state can be weak in its institutional framework (particularly with regard
to control over the use of force), or in the cohesive idea, which should bind
state and society, or because ofan inappropriate population/territory ratio or
unsettled territorial boundaries.
It is important not to reifr the state as some kind of autonomous entity. In
this context we read in Weber (rq68):
Thus, for instance, one of the important aspects of the existence of a mod-
ern state, precisely as a complex of social interaction of individual persons,
consists in the fact that the action of various individuals is oriented to the
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legal sense. .. A "state", for example, ceases to exist in a sociologically rel-
evant sense whenever there is no longer a probability that certain kinds of
meaningfully oriented social action will take place (Ibid.: p.L4,p.27).
It is people who bring a state to life or let it collapse, who exist before the state
and who finally determine whether a given political entity is considered a
state. In the Somali case the three constituent parts - the idea of the state, the
physical base ofthe state (territory and population), and the institutional ex-
pression ofthe state - all collapsed.
THs Iopa oF THE Srare
The idea of the state, reflecting its political identity and the bond between soci-
ety and state, in other words, the leading ideology propagated by the Somali
state leadership, was, in retrospect, threefold.
First, the'Greater Somalia' quest for the unification of all Somali-inhabited
territories in the Horn within one nation-state was a sacrosanct idea for the
early post-colonial state. After 1969, the socialist Somali state, too, relied on
the idea of 'Greater Somalia' to rally people behind its policies (Laitin and
Samatar, 1987). 'Greater Somalia'lost momentum after Somalia's defeat in the
Ethiopian-Somali war over the Ethiopian-Somali borders, known as the
Ogaden-war, in977178.
Second, scientific socialism - Hanti-wadaagga'ilmi ku disan,literally 'sharing
wealth based on wisdom' - was officially announced as the ideology of the
state on the first anniversary of the Revolution in r97o (Lewis, 1988; Samatar,
1988). Together with it went the political goal of eradicating tribalism within
Somali society: people were no longer allowed to address each other as cousins
or brothers (walaal), but only as comrades (jaale); the aqil, the head of a
clan-lineage and mediator between state and traditional political authority
during colonial times, was renamed nabad doon, literally meaning 'peace-
maker'. However, these socialist ideals, if ever a genuine goal, faded away with
the increasing decay of Somali state politics into coercion, ruthless state ter-
rorism and the perfecting ofsophisticated tactics of divide and rule based on
clan antagonisms (Africa Watch, r99o).
Third,thebond between Somali society and state was based on the perception





































as by foreign and Somali academic analysts and political commentators, as an
ethnically homogeneous nation of camel nomads.' In the ideological vacuum
ofthe recent stateless years (since r99r) this perception has been increasingly
challenged by Somali and non-Somali scholars, who stress the diversitywithin
Somali society and who have unveiled the history of domination of nomadic
Somali over sedentary Somali (Mohamed Safih and Wohlgemuth, r994a;
Ahmed, ry9ja). The critique points out how the myth of Somali origin, which
classifies the Somali people as being in between African and Arab (see
Mukhtar, 1995; Kusow, 1995; Ahmed, r995b), was politicized and became a tool
of political power in the hands of clans with a nomadic background. The col-
lapse of the state in r99r revealed thè{undamental crisis of Somali political and
social identity, a crisis reflected in the breakdown ofsocial conscience and the
apocalyptic experiences of a cruel civil war.
Srere TERRrroRy
The physical base of the Somali state, combining territory and population,
also collapsed - ifit ever really existed. It is widely recognized that state bor-
ders on the African continent often have little to do with underlying socio-
geographic realities. This also applies to the Horn of Africa and the Somali
region in particular. In colonial times the Somali region was divided amongst
Italy (South, Central and Northeastern region), Britain (North and South-
west), France (Northwest) and Ethiopia (West). In 196o, the newly independ-
ent British Somaliland and the uN Trusteeship-territory under Italian admin-
istration united to form the Republic Somalia, while the Northern Frontier
District stayed with Kenya,' the Ogaden, Eastern Hararghe and Bale regions
remained part of Ethiopia and,inr977, French Somaliland finally became Dji-
bouti. The territorial base of the Somali state, therefore, never reflected the
territorial base of Somali society or the Somali-inhabited areas in the Horn.
This is where the origin of demands for a'Greater Somalia'lies.
The physical base ofthe state generally refers to the legal definition ofstate
territory in international law (jackson and Rosberg, r98z). In this sense, and
r One example of many is Laitin and Samatar (1987).
z Kenya became independent in r963. In a referendum shortly before independence, a
majorityin the Northern Frontier District, the Somali-inhabited areas in Northeastern




despite its physical collapse it seems that the Somali state is still internationally
recognized. Although there has been no central government in Somalia since
r99r, the uN and other international organizations still consider the borders of
the ex-Somali state as a reference point for their policies towards Somalia. The
uN strategy, particularly during the uNosorvr operations, as well as the atti-
tude of foreign governments towards the Somali question, is reflected in their
reaction to the proclamation of independence by Somaliland (the Northwest-
ern territory, former British Somaliland Protectorate) in May r99r (Brons,
1993). Although external actors respect he existence ofthe'Northern author-
ities' as legitimate political authorities, Somaliland still awaits international
recognition. In spite of this anomaly, however, there is no doubt that the So-
mali state (196o-199r) collapsed territorially in r99r, with its population and
territory divided into several entities.
Apart from the connotation of 'state-territory', territoriality in the Somali
context has another dimension. The agro-pastoral and pastoral clans, in par-
ticular, move according to climatic conditions and the needs of their herds
for water and pasture. Their territories are defined according to the pastoral
way of life that has little to do with international law, whose rules of the game
were set by colonial powers. Thus, for about a century, international borders
have divided Somali clan territories. The lands of the Southern agricultural
clans also stretch across international borders into Ethiopia. Yet - and this
may be different from other cases in Africa - despite international borders,
clan territories are very much integrated in the economic, social and political
life of the Somali. The Somali conceptualization of territoriality as derived
from geographic, economic and trading patterns also impacts on settlement
patterns and social and political norms and perceptions. In terms of terri-
toriality, one could speak today of three distinct territories in the Somali-
inhabited areas of the Horn. (See maps r and z). These are: (r) the Northwest-
ern region including the 'Somali part' of Djibouti, Somaliland and the North-
western part of the Somali 'region 5' in Ethiopia; (z) the South, stretching
from the Somali-inhabited Northeastern Moyale district in Kenya in the
West to the Southern edge of the Ethiopian region 5 in the North, up to the
areas just beyond the Shabelle river in the East; and (f) the Central and
Northeastern region making up the tip of the Horn and stretching into
Southern Ethiopia. As will be shown later, these regions are political as well as
economic units as a result of familyiclan connections, pastoral movement
and trade.
Although we will, of course, return to questions of territory in the rest of
this study, these remarks should be sufficient to highlight some of the contra-







































insignificance of state territorial boundaries for the life of the common Somali
people.
SrerE INsrrruuoNs
State institutions, which carried the executive, legislative and judicial powers
of the Somali state, stopped functioning in r99r. Government employees, most
of who were in one way or another related to the politically powerful clans
dominating the Siyad Barre regime, fled from violence that was fuelled by
emotions of hatred and revenge. Government offices, ministries, the National
Bank, army and police, courts, postal services and educational institutions dis-
integrated. Indeed, not only did the state institutions cease to function, but
also buildings and equipment were looted beyond recognition. Arms, money,
office files, books, furniture, technical apparatus, telephones and wires, water-
pipes, roofs, window-frames - everJthing was taken, sold or destroyed. The
extreme devastation of the institutional framework of the Somali state must be
taken into account when state reconstruction on Somali soil is discussed.
State territory, state institutions and various ideas/ideologies were expected
to build the bond between Somali society and state, but collapsed and proved
to have been weak social constructions all along. So what did survive? Life
went on in Somalia in a situation of statelessness. Members of Somali sociefy
turned to alternative security arrangements, most of which had existed side by
side or in conjunction with state institutions. If such security arrangements,
rooted in the non-state social sphere, prove superior to those that a proto-
state can provide, especially in the sensitive task of controlling the means of
violence, then is it possible that Somalis might prefer to continue living with-
out a conventional state institutional framework (Doornbos and Markakis,
1994)? Alternatively, is it possible that previously non-state institutions of se-
curity provision will be transformed into state institutions? Such a process
would reflect a bottom-up dynamic of institution building and an essentially
consensus-based attempt at state formation. A third scenario envisages atop-
down state formation process (perhaps externally driven) that would bring
(parts of1 Somali society under state control.
Somali society is not static but flexible and rich in variety, that is reflected in
categories of clan and class, in regional differences of economic production
patterns, of language, tradition and history. In addition, Somali society today
is divided between those who live abroad as international migrants and those
who stayed at home in the region. This background gives rise to the question
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state. Military faction leaders, former civil servants, businessmen and traders,
educated women, farmers in the South and nomads in the North, all have dif-
ferent and sometimes conflicting visions about structures and functions of a
future Somali state.
In the light of the various options with which Somali society is confronted, I
intend critically to evaluate the post-r99r attempts at and processes of state
formation within the territory of ex-Somalia.
Objectives of the Study
This book is intended to provide a contribution to three interrelated fields of
inquiry. Firstly, it offers an account of the impact of state formation, state col-
lapse and renewed state formation processes on the Somali people, highlight-
ing their heterogeneity rather than their homogeneity.'Findings are based on
my own field research in the broader Somali region as well as in Nairobi and
Addis Ababa during the years ry86, t99rl9z and ry96197. The characterization
of past and contemporary Somali society is based on a wealth of literature on
Somali society, history and politics as well as on works, in particular those by
Somali social scientists that reflect new trends in re-reading the past and ana-
lyzing the present. In this context, I have endeavored to include the literature,
which reflects the'fresh wind'blowing in Somali studies, breaking away from
3 Recent publications show how the image of homogeneity is sustained; if the farm-
ing communities are mentioned at all, they are portrayed as somali minorities or as
non-Somali. "In general, the Somali people share a common language (Somaale), reli-
gion (Islam)' physical characteristics, and pastoral and agropastoral customs and tra-
ditions" (Adam, ry95 p.7o). Again: "For centuries before the European colonial era,
somalia was a pastoral and nomadic society. Herders of camels, cattle and sheep lived
in a world of 'egalitarian anarchy' where the main preoccupation of clan families was
the well-being of the herd. with the exception of small Bantu communities along the
Juba and shebelle Rivers, there were no ethnic or religious minorities. It was a singular
homogeneous culture that in theory should have come into the modern era in a cohe-
sive and stable way. ... From the tenth century on, ethnic somalis were dispersed
throughout the Horn ofAfrica in a continuous search for forage and water for their
herds. In the riverine area between the Juba and shebelle, a small number practised
maize and millet agriculture, and a small trading class along the coast maintained con-



































stereotyped accounts of Somali society.'In this way I hope to contribute to the
academic debate in the field of Somali studies.
The second field is that of critical security studies. The Somali experience, a
case where open state collapse has taken place, offers a challenging opportu-
nity for study in the light of the premises of critical security studies. This book
is intended to make a contribution to this endeavor.
The third contribution, which this study hopes to give, is to the discussion
concerning external intervention. By integrating a trans-national security-
provision dimension into the analysis of Somali state-formation processes, it
provides themes for a critical evaluation of the impact of external involvement
on internal political processes in Somalia. I am referring not only to uN in-
volvement in peacemaking, peace-enforcement and humanitarian interven-
tion,t or to short-term emergency relief, but also to the long-term impact of
international involvement. The awareness of international agencies and for-
eign governments needs to be raised with regard to the dangers of external in-
volvement (including in the choice of participants for negotiations)u for the
political balance of the no-state situation in Somalia.
Structure ofthe Book
Following this introduction, the book begins by developing an analytical
framework that will guide the reader through the study of the Somali experi-
ence (chapter z). The first part of chapter z elucidates two analytical ap-
proaches to state formation reflecting bottom-up and top-down dynamics and
borrowing from the philosophical consent heory and the historical force theo-
ry of the origin of the state. The second part of the chapter focuses on a re-
conceptualization ofthe term 'sovereignty'. Challenges to the paradigm ofstate
sovereignty from within and beyond society are discussed, and the argument is
made for an analytical shift from undivided state sovereignty to divided sover-
4 Among these are Ahmed (r995a) and Besteman and Cassanelli (rgg6). Not included
are French, Italian, Arabic and non-translated Somali literature. German literature rs
used to a limited extent.
5 The uN intervention in Somalia is dealt with in Brons (1997).
6 Interview with Gian Paolo Aloi, the Head of the Local Administration Structures
Unit at the United Nations Development Office for Somalia (uNoos), Nairobi, g Oc-
tober 1997. He considered finding and choosing the 'right' interlocutors one of the
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eignty beyond the state. The third part ofthe chapter concentrates on the term
'security' and the way it is conceptualized in conventional and in critical secu-
rity studies. Security, it is argued, needs to be conceptualized broadly, looking
beyond military/strategic considerations to include economic, social and envi-
ronmental factors. Like 'sovereignty', it must also refer to sub-state and trans-
state spheres that interact with the state. In this way, the linkages between local,
national, regional and international security can be drawn. Conditions for sus-
tainable state formation are seen to obtain where the state institutional frame-
work is considered to be the primus inter pares option for the provision of
security. The last part of chapter z summarizes the analytical framework and
elucidates the methodology applied in the Somali case study.
Chapters 3 and 4 describe Somali society in a situation of statelessness.
Chapter 3 provides an introduction to Somali geography, subsistence and
economy, while chapter 4 concentrates on a description of Somali identity and
society, in which reference is made to anthropological and historical material
as well as to contemporary accounts of the characteristics of the Somali people'
In chapter 5, a link is established between theory and the specific case'
Referring back to the methodological considerations at the end of chapter z,
I give an overview of relative security providing social arrangements that
shows the various dimensions of (in)security which have been prominent in
stateless Somali society.
Chapters 6 and 7 are taken up with the analysis of the Somali state(s). Chap-
ter 6 looks at the impact of colonial state policies on Somali society and at
Somali state formation attempts that developed in response to colonial occu-
pation. Chapter 7 analyses the period since independence, including the inde-
pendent Somali state (196o-1969), and the socialist state which was formed af-
rer the coup d'état iu969, and which finally collapsed in |anuary r99r. It ad-
dresses a number of questions: the degree of security, or insecurity, which
these states provided to different parts of Somali societp the sources of sover-
eignty which the states could claim; and how other non-state security net-
works performed in reaction to state policies. The chapter then deals with the
results of increasingly dictatorial state policies, leading to the development of
political opposition in Somalia and to declining state authority. It describes
the slide into open civil war, state collapse and ensuing statelessness.
Chapter 8 deals with the period of statelessness in Somalia from r99r on-
wards. It examines the networks, which were activated in order to deal with
violence and to secure survival, and economic and political stability. In the
first part of the chapter, the political economy of continuous violence in the
Southern areas, the weaknesses and strengths of sub-state mechanisms vis-à-


















the form of the uN involvement in Somalia are discussed. The second part of
the chapter focuses on the processes of political authority formation that took
place in the post-collapse years. The cases of Somaliland, the Digil Mirifle
Governing Authority and Puntland are used to analyze perceptions and prob-
lems with regard to territoriality, the emergence of cohesive ideas and ideo-
logies within these polities and the performance of political authorities with
regard to the control ofviolence. This brings us back to the three pillars of
the state - territory and population, idea, and institutions - and asks how the
political/state authorities described in the chapter measure up in these areas.
In a concluding chapter (chapter g), the findings deriving from the case
study are linked back to the theoretical discussion in the early chapters ofthe
book. Does the Somali experience offer insights that are relevant for the for-
mulation of a critical approach to security studies and a theory of divided sov-
ereignty? And - as theory and practice are considered mutually influencing -
does a society-based theoretical approach to security and sovereignty provide
a suitable framework for analyzíngcases of hidden and open state collapse?
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